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By WILLIAM L.
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Whether or not troops of the United States ever join in the fighting
on the fields of France; whether or not the military resources of the
United States are marshalled into an army ready for battle before
the dawn of peace sends the wonderfully organized military, industrial and civic forces of Europe back to take up again the threads of
a transformed industrial life, the admonitions of the European
experience and the reconstructive impulses of the present period of
preparation in this country are certain to combine to bring marked
changes in the integration, co6rdination, and general organization
of public affairs and commercial management in the Unitcd States.
The sort of thing which has been done in many departments of
governmental activity, under the pressure of wartime necessity and
as a measure of organization for national self-preservation, will be
carried on and extended by men who believe that if such things
can be done for public benefit in time of war, similar things can be
done for public benefit in time of peace. England and France will
not soon return to slip-shod, unsuited methods of mis-managing
public or private concerns; and an aftermath along similar lines
seems inevitable inthe Unqited States, irrespective of whether it develops
that America has entered the war only in time to gain a seat which
would otherwise have been denied at the council-table where an
enduring peace is to be builded for a transformed world. No one
can read English newspapers and periodicals during the past year
without a realization that in the re-organization of industry, the
"speeding up" and "tuning up" of public administration, and the
development of an altered attitude on the part of the general public
towards essentially public concerns, the last two years of the war
ILL.B., Cornell, 19o5; formerly Justice of the City Court of New York;
recently appointed Chief Counsel of the New York State Public Service
Commission for the First (New York City) District.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
have been more eventful, more fruitful, and more far-reaching than
any other two hundred years of Anglo-Saxon history. England will
never return to anything like the old r6gime, and all the world will
feel the consequences, irrespective of whether a particular nation is
or is not impelled to similar action by similar necessities.
The Demand for Improved Judicial Machinery
The ending of the need for better organization for war is bound
to bring, in the United States and elsewhere, emphasis on the need
for better organization for the tasks of peace. Old formulas and
methods will be squarely challenged and unhesitatingly discarded,
if found at variance with the recent experience. The ten years
following the close of the World War are almost certain to be years
of iconoclasm, of smashing of idols and breaking down of long established institutions; of pre-disposition to change and restless searching
for methods which minister more directly and unmistakably to
newly manifest needs. Institutions which are to survive will have
to be put in order to meet the challenge and endure the test; members
of the bar will in particular, as is traditionally true in all periods of
flux and readjustment, be confronted with an especial responsibility,
two-fold in its aspect: a responsibility for an open-minded readiness
to work out needed changes in a timely, sound, constructive way,
and a responsibility for leadership in resisting mere denunciation
and demand for mere change for its own sake, whether for better
or for worse.
We have been talking and writing about judicial reform in the
United States for a good many years, and have been making considerable headway, more than is readily recognized even by the bar,
and far more than is ever recognized by the ready lay critic of courts
and legal institutions. At the same time I have not the slightest
doubt that the severest test of, and onslaught upon, the American
system of administering justice according to law is still ahead;
and changes are coming within the next twenty years far more
drastic and thorough-going than have thus far taken place, from the
time our constitution was set up and the English common law
appropriated from across the seas. I do not think the assault will
be made upon the spirit or substance of our laws, or upon the ultimate
responsiveness of the courts and legal doctrine to the changed social
standards of the people; I think our constitution and our common
law, supplemented by statute, will continue susceptible of constructive and progressive adaptation, as Mr. justice Moody said, "to
the infinite variety of the changing conditions of our National life."
The difficulty is coming as to the mechanics of our judicial system,

BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
the suitability of present-day legal procedure as a modem device
for the accomplishment of a basic end, the administration of prompt,
impartial justice under law. Some of the reasons for the above-stated
conclusion were indicated in my previous article2 of this series; the
purpose of that article and this, both written under circumstances
which prevented careful phrasing or the full working out of details,
has been to interest, if possible, young men of the law schools in
the statesman-like aspects of the problem with which they will soon
have to deal as members of the bar, and to induce them to enter
the profession with all possible reverence for the law, but with no
disposition to take for granted, as the "last word" on the subject,
the procedural mechanism and form of organization through which
the law is now applied in the arbitrament of human controversies.

New Aspects of An Old Demand
The economic and social readjustments following inthe wake of the
war are bound to give new force to the demand for more suitable
organization and more direct administrative expedients in the judicial
branch of government. Already the iconoclastic voice of the lay
critic is being heard along lines well-founded only in part. For
example, an excellent article in a current issue of the widely circulated Saturday Evening Post, dealing with the readjustments
which war-time conditions ought to bring, concluded as follows:
"The thing which refuses to change-the one bulwark of our civilization which declines to conform itself to modem needs and modem
conditions and modem transformations-is the method of administering and interpreting the civil and the criminal laws. The surgeon
who dared practice his profession by the ethics and the standards
of a hundred years ago, or even of fifty years ago, would be prosecuted,
most likely, for malpractice; the business man who endeavored to
carry on his business as his grandfather before him had carried it on
would go briskly into bankruptcy; the editor who ran his newspaper
the way they ran newspapers when Horace Greeley and George D.
Prentice were alive wouldn't run it any longer than it took for
the sheriff to catch up with him; but the lawyer hobbles along in
his rusty shackles, clanking the leg-irons of ancient precedent, and
violently opposing the introduction of labor-saving, time-conserving
improvements into his trade, because such steps would distress Coke,
and possibly give pain to Littleton, and mayhap cause Blackstone
peevishly to toss about beneath his tombstone. Counsel for the
other side still may browbeat the citizen on the witness stand as
though the latter were a malefactor at the bar, doing it with the full
2 Cornell
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approval of His Honor upon the bench, not because there is any
fairness in it, but because such always has been the rule in courts of
law. Because of a steadfast devotion, among the lawyers and the
judges, to traditions and to texts and to precepts which in other
callings would have been outgrown and cast aside years and years
ago, litigation means vexation and justice stands blindfolded with
procrastination on her one hand and delay on her other. A misplaced
comma in the indictment invalidates the just conviction of the
criminal and saves him from the punishment he merits. The mote
is more important to be plucked away than the beam, and those
august gentlemen in silken robes, sitting in the high places of the
high temple, gag at the gnat and swallow the camel without visible
strain. That bumpy, torpid appearance, so often observed, is the
result of having swallowed many camels. Verily, as has been said
before, we live in times of change, and no man knows what the morrow
may bring forth; but of this much we may be sure: That, disdaining
all the filtration devices of progress, the law will continue to be true
to the moss-covered precedent, the iron-bound precedent that
hangs in the well."
The Layman's Challenge to the Newer Generation of Lawyers
Much of this appears to the trained legal mind to be loose and
undiscriminating lay comment, but therein lies most of the danger.
The constructive tasks of the post-bellum period are not likely to be
reposed in the hands of judges or lawyers; laymen commonly think
something very closely approximating the statements above quoted;
and unless jurists and lawyers deal with these procedural derelictions
in timely and adequate fashion, laymen are likely to make short
shrift of legal traditions and impatiently to brush away formulas
which lawyers like to think are essential to the very life of the law.
In my previous article I undertook to indicate a personal opinion,
based on a good deal of effort to ascertain the actual workings of
the minds of business men on the subject and the real reasons which
impel them to an attitude now too commonly held. That opinion
was, and is, that business men are today deterred from going to court
by reason of the cumbersomeness, dilatoriness, and unsuitableness
of judicial machinery, rather than any aversion to the settlement of
their disputes according to principles of the substantive law. Business men have no great quarrel, as a rule, with the legal concepts
which the common law, as modified by statute, would apply to the
arbitrament of their business dealings; they wish, and need, certainty
and equality as the underlying bases of their activities; they wish,
and need, to know that when they do a certain thing in a certain way
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or enter into an agreement in a certain form, their rights and liabilities
will be so-and-so, definable and ascertainable in advance. But for
the court as a mechanism for promptly, acceptably applying that
acceptable standard, the business man has today an instinctive
distrust and dislike; legal procedure is too complicated, technical,
indirect, dilatory, wasteful of his time and everyone else's, to warrant
him in taking any avoidable chances with the judicial mill. Procedural matters create an atmosphere of technicality, and he stays
away for fear of being impaled, and finding his rights lost altogether,
on points too fine for his reason, common sense, or instinctive sense
of fairness and the fitness of things.
HaphazardTechnicalitiesWhich Make JudicialAdministration Absurd
Instances of haphazard and unco6rdinated provisions, of the kind
which have the effect just indicated, may be cited from the code
sections governing almost any court. They naturally arouse the
contempt of a business man when he finds himself trying to steer a
course through and by them; they drive him from the court-house
with the impression that he and other business men are sure to lose,
no matter who wins the juridical verdict, if they have anything to do
with "a game played under such rules"; they represent a kind of
"trappings" and "red tape" which business men have jong since
rejected, in the conduct of other aspects of human relationship.
A single instance may suffice at this point. For reasons which are
indicated in some detail elsewhere in this article, the City Court of
New York, of which I am a member, is the natural forum for the
business men of the metropolis. It is, in many respects, as it has
been called, "the great commercial court of the metropolis," because
its jurisdiction embraces a large part of the controversies which arise
between the great rank and file of small business men, and its calendar
practice has been adjusted in certain respects to develop the court as
an acceptable commercial forum. Because it is no worse off than
alternative forums, even in the respect I am about to indicate,
the City Court continues to be the tribunal for the trial of a large
part of these controversies, yet what of the procedural maze which
envelops the unhappy litigant as he contemplates this "business man's
court"?
A plaintiff may sue in the City Court for any amount of recovery
in any action,-for example, for thirty thousand dollars, instead of
two thousand; the jury may render in his favor a verdict in any sum
in any action; but in certain kinds of actions,-in fact, in most
actions, the clerk may not enter the verdict in a sum exceeding $2,ooo.
If the jury finds for more than $2,000, there are certain kinds of
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actions in which he may enter a verdict for the full amount as rendered; for example, there have been judgments for $20,000 or $30,000.
But in other kinds of actions, he may not enter the verdict in a sum
exceeding $2,000, no matter what the verdict in fact was. At the
same time he may enter the verdict for $2,000 plus interest, in certain
instances where interest is an allowable factor, even though the addition of interest brings the verdict's total to a sum greatly exceeding
$2,0oo, as is often the case.
On the other hand, if a plaintiff sues in the City Court for any
amount, say $500, the defendant may interpose a counterclaim
without limit, and, although a counterclaim is merely the crossassertion of a separate right of action which he might have asserted
in a separate action, he may recover, and the clerk may enter, a
verdict in any sum on the counterclaim. If the plaintiff is entitled
to sue for more than $2,000, the City Court cannot award him more
than that sum; the defendant's counterclaim is bound by no such
limitation. If the jury's verdict in the action in favor of the defendant on the counterclaim proves to be for $50,000, or any greater or
lesser sum, the clerk is authorized to enter the verdict in the sum fixed
by the jury, even though the plaintiff only sued for $5oo, or even
though the plaintiff would have been fairly entitled to receive more
than $2,000, but could not, had the disputed questions of fact been
determined by the jury the other way.
If a bond is given in one of the classes of actions in which a plaintiff's verdict may not be entered in a sum exceeding $2,000 and
interest, and an action is brought in the City Court upon that bond,
there is no jurisdictional limit on the amount for which judgment
may be entered in the action on the bond, even though there was in
the action in which the bond was given.
If a business man as plaintiff sues in the City Court to recover a
chattel, more than $2,000 may not be fixed as the value of the chattel,
but if the same man sues for damages for the detention of the same
chattel, he may recover $20,000 or $2,000,000. There is no limit
on his recovery.
Why Business Men Eschew Litigation
Instances like these rouse and rally the enthusiasm of the business
man for resort to "the business man's court"! If the master of a
ship assaults one of its seamen while the ship is tied at the wharf
in the port of New York, the City Court of New York may not award
the injured mariner more than $2,000. If the assault and battery
took place while the ship was three miles out at sea, the same court
may award the same plaintiff any sum warranted by the evidence,
without limit.
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If a young woman quarrels with her sweetheart and wants to
recover back the money she had lent him while she thought they were
to be "partners" for life, the City Court can give her only $2,000 of
whatever may have been the actual amount loaned, yet if the same
girl sues the same man in the same court for his breach of his promise
to marry her, she may receive a verdict in any amount, without limit,
and verdicts greatly in excess of $2,000 are by no means uncommon.
If a business man wishes to sue the City of New York, he will be
surprised and puzzled to find that he cannot sue the city in the City
Court! He must sue the city in the Supreme or Municipal Court.
If he wishes to sue a defendant in the City Court, he may not
serve the defendant with the summons anywhere in the city, but
only in certain parts of the city. If he wishes to be able to serve his
adversary anywhere in the city, he must forego suing him in the City
Court and sue instead in the Supreme or Municipal Court.
The City Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a cause
of action in equity, but it may hear and determine equitable defenses
in order to defeat a cause of action of which it has jurisdiction at law.
If the business man sues in the Supreme Court and his case is on
the calendar eight terms of court, he may, when he prevails in the
action, tax as costs an allowance for five terms; if he sues in the City
Court, he may tax but one term, even though the case was on the
calendar eight or ten terms.
Confusing Choice of Forms and Forums
Imagine the impressions which an average business man forms of
legal procedure and technicalities as he comes in contact with some
of these hit-and-miss distinctions. Try to conjure up the impressions
which he carries away with him after a period of jury service.
Picture the difficulties of a lawyer endeavoring to explain the "whys
and wherefores" of such artificalities to a busy client unlearned in the
law. The City Court may grant the business man as litigant a
warrant of attachment against the property of a foreign corporation,
but not a domestic corporation; it may upon his application aid
him to collect an adjudicated debt from a foreign cbrporation by
appointing a receiver of its property and assets, but if the "deadbeat" debtor be one of New York State's own creations, incorporated
under the laws of the state which creates the court, the latter can
aid him in no such way.
If the business man wants his attorney to obtain an attachment
in New York County, he finds a confusing choice of forms and
forums. Four different and separate modes and details of application are prescribed in separated sections of the code,-one each for
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the Supreme Court, the City Court, the County Courts, and the
Municipal Courts. A form of application sufficient in one court is
fatally defective in another, although each application seeks exactly
the same remedy. If the business man's lawyer makes the right
form of application to the wrong court, his bewildered client is at
least delayed, and is often defeated, in his interlocutory right, on
which jurisdiction or the collectibility of his judgment may wholly
depend.
In the Name of "Reform" and "Simplification"
And so it goes. Instances might be extended and multiplied.
Many of these anomalies were graphically summarized by my former
colleague, now Supreme Court Justice Donnelly, in an address before
the New York County Lawyers' Association in January, 1912.
These instances do not concern some slow-going court in a backwoods community, but "the business man's court" in the greatest
city in the world. Similar things exist and persist in practically
every court I know; I have cited these because they have come
nearest my heart and daily work for three and a quarter years last
past. Only the legislature has power to change them; only constitutional amendment could take awhy from the legislature the power
to change them, or to restore them, were they changed. They
exist and persist; business men are bewildered and driven to distrust
courts and avoid litigation; newcomers to our shores are given the
impression that courts and laws, the very corner-stone of our American concept of equal rights under uniform and salutary rules, cannot
be made to operate for their protection, but are something to be
avoided at all hazards. And within the past few months an able
and representative committee of the legislature, headed by an able
lawyer who is a popular alumnus of Cornell University, very solemnly
proposed to "revise and simplify" procedure in the City Court by
bringing all these anomalies and anachronisms together into one
"City Court Act," carefully preserving each and every one that I have
cited and multitudes more! This drastic and thorough-going reform
has happily been postponed for the time, and the lawyer who wishes
to find the code authority for these absurdities will have to go on
searching through many pages and countless sections; but, unless
revelation be deemed the beginning of betterment, the careful
collection, codification, preservation and perpetuation of such
"trappings" and handicaps on a "business man's court" can hardly
be deemed even a start in the direction of law reform.
A Concrete Instance of Relief from Delay and Congestion
What I have been saying on the subject of the betterments which
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might, in many instances, be worked out by and through the judges
themselves, without change in the constitution or code, has not
been from a viewpoint wholly academic and theoretical. I have
had a part in working out some instances of this sort of thing, in an
atmosphere which will not be recognized as traditionally favorable,
and have had an opportunity to see, concretely and from day to day,
some of the actual workings of innovations which were inaugurated
with some judicial misgivings. For example, as I have indicated,
the City Court is in many respects the natural forum for the great
volume of litigation which arises in the course of the metropolitan
business transactions of the smaller dealers, merchants, and jobbers,
with their wholesalers on the one hand and their customers on the
other. The City Court is naturally a great commercial court, to
which are naturally brought the minor business controversies of
business men in this great metropolitan center. Mixed in with this
grist of commercial actions has been a great volume of tort actions
of various kinds. For many years, it has been the custom to place
all cases, whether contract or tort, commercial or otherwise, on the
same calendar, and to afford them opportunity for trial when reached
in the regular course, subject only to an anomalous and utterly
unsound theory of preference, viz., that if it appeared probable that
a non-tort case could be tried within two hours, such a case
could, on motion addressed largely to the discretion of the Justices
sitting in Special Term, be placed on a special calendar, known as
the "short-cause" calendar and afforded a trial thereon within a
few weeks or months. The natural result of this miscellaneous
grouping was congestion. Defenses of the most labored and plainly
perjured character were interposed, in the form of verified pleadings,
on the most flimsy pretexts; just enough was denied to create an
issue avoiding the possibility of judgment on the pleadings. Thus a
default was avoided and the case was placed on the calendar, which
meant a protracted period of delay. By the time the case was actually
reached for trial, the elasticity of the memories of witnesses had often
been refreshed most liberally from the necessities imposed by the
applicable rules of law, and a defense, originally interposed only for
the purpose of creating an issue which would enable the long delay
of trial, became a defense supported by more or less plausible testimony sufficient to carry the case to the jury. The result of the
calendar system was thus long delay, and the result of long delay
was to put a premium on perjury and make the way easier to a
perversion of the facts by the testimony as ultimately given. The
calendar of the City Court had in consequence gained a tradition of
being a long time in arrears, and at the close of the administration
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of Governor Hughes, we find a trenchant paragraph of complaint
in his annual message, based on the fact that the City Court calendar
was then upwards of three years behind.
The situation in 1913 and 1914 was not as bad as it had been,
but the tort-contract general calendar was still more than a year
behind, and the possibility of delay in the trial and disposition of
commercial cases was still so great as virtually to compel small
business men to settle rather than litigate. In this way there was
substantially a denial to them of that justice under law which should
be the portion of all men in a democracy. Iaccordingly urged upon
my associates the advisability of creating a separate "Commercial
Calendar," on which might be separately and speedily tried all
commercial cases, that is to say, the business men's controversies,
in which money has been definitely laid out or goods delivered,
as to which the party suing cannot afford to remain long unrecompensed, if entitled to recover at all; 'for example, actions for money
loaned, actions on bonds and instruments of guaranty, actions on
written contracts for the payment of sums of money only, actions
for work, labor and services, actions arising under the provisions
of the Personal Property Law (Uniform Sales Act) in relation to.the
sale and delivery of goods, and the like. It was pointed out that,
not only would justice be more substantially accomplished by a
speedy trial of this class of cases, but that prompt trial would almost
certainly enable all litigation of this kind to be disposed of in less
time than required for its disposition under the system which mixed
these cases on a congested calendar greatly in arrears. It was
urged that in this way all commercial actions of the sort indicated
could be "preferred" and given practically immediate trial on a
special "Commercial Calendar," to which two trial parts of the court
could be assigned, and that before very long it would be found
that this preferment of the commercial causes would operate to reduce
the arrearage of the general calendar as well, through reducing the
quantity of time required for the trial or other disposition of the
commercial causes so preferred.
The Working of the "Commercial Calendar"
The Justices of the City Court accordingly created, by their own
rule, the now well-known "Commercial Calendar" of that court,
and provided that upon the application of either side, a cause coming
within one of the indicated categories could be transferred from the
General Calendar to that calendar for trial. The plan has worked
well for more than two years, has overcome all misgivings and
exceeded all expectations in its practical workings. It has brought
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into the court new and desirable litigation, and with it also lawyers of
a grade who had generally shunned the long delays of the general
hodge-podge calendar. Notwithstanding the influx of additional
commercial business, the proportion of the total trial-term time of
sittings required for the disposition of the commercial business has
been reduced, so that more time has apparently been available for
the dispatch of the tort cases and other litigation. Instead of thrusting the tort calendar into further arrearage, the plan seems to have
had an influence in accelerating the dispatch of business throughout
the court, and during two years and a half of practically immediate
trial of commercial cases, the arrearage on the general calendar
has been steadily reduced. At the time of the writing of this article,
the general calendar was only a few months behind, with a prospect
that the month of June, or next October or November at the latest,
will find the general calendar within a month of being up to date,
which is about as complete an approximation of "speedy justice"
as is practicable or desirable in the case of a tort calendar, made up
of cases in which the plaintiff should at least be given time to get
out of the hospital before the case comes on for trial.
During these two years and a half, therefore, it has been possible
for a business man, if he had a cause of action withiti the limits of
the jurisdiction of the City Court, to start his action and have a trial,
if he so desires and so directs his counsel, well within the month
from the time his cause of complaint arises. I have tried cases
on this commercial calendar in which suit was started, tried, judgment obtained, execution issued, and the judgment paid and satisfied,
within a month from the day on which the cause of action arose.
Twice within the past week I have found myself trying cases which
had been ten days at issue. The result has been that lawyers and
litigants have realized that through the agency of this special calendar
a practically immediate trial could be had of a commercial controversy. Some of the consequences of this have been most interesting
to watch; they afford an explanation why it has been true that an
increased volume of commercial business could be disposed of,-note
I have not said "tried," in less time than was required for the dispatch
of this business when reached on a congested and long-delayed
general calendar. In the first place, fewer fictitious, sham and
perjured defenses are interposed; defendants will perjure themselves
to create an issue which would gain a delay of a year or two, but will
not take the risk to gain a delay of a few days. Thus a smaller
portion of the actions started are ever actually tried. It may be
said also that many actions are not started at all now which found a
place on the general calendar heretofore, because there is less incentive
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for a "strike" suit, it if is likely to be disposed of within a few days,
when all the facts and documents are at hand and within the recollection of everybody.
Prompt Trial DecreasesPerjury
Furthermore, the prompt trial of these cases has had a most
interesting effect upon the psychology and atmosphere of the trials
themselves. After a year's delay, or two years', the parties and
witnesses seem far more likely to give versions of the events which
may euphemistically be said to "fit the law" and so to present
questions of fact on which the determination of a jury is required.
Beyond a doubt, in many instances, what takes place is that the
witness forgets in the long interval the precise details as to which
he had a measure of knowledge at the time the controversy arose.
By the time the case comes on for trial the details have for the
most part passed from memory and his recollection is refreshed
from the lawyer's notes or oral re-statements to him of the line
of testimony which is expected from him. A great deal of unwitting
perjury, of radical shading and re-interpretation of details, is thus
accomplished, where there is long delay in trial. But given a
trial within a month or two after the trouble arose, and the atmosphere of the trial is far different. The witnesses give a much more
straightforward, credible, dependable version of what took place;
they are testifying from their own fair recollection; there is less
disposition, less incentive, and less favorable setting, for conscious
or unconscious re-shaping of details of the testimony. In consequence, the cases much less frequently become questions of fact
for the jury; far more often they present only questions of law for
the court, and their prompt disposition is facilitated. One who has
not watched the thing from day to day from the "inside," can have
no accurate conception of the difference in the atmosphere of a trial,
conducted on a calendar which is continuously up-to-date, as compared with that of a trial on a general calendar which ever lags a
year or two behind. Prompt trial is the greatest preventive of
perjury which the mind of man has ever devised.
I promised the editors of THa CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY that in
this article I would indicate concretely some of the impressions,
queries and suggestions which have come to me during my brief
period of service in a busy court, as well as during rather strenuous
professional activity prior to election to the bench. Elimination
of the law's delay is of course only one phase of the problem, one
segment of the circle. Justice poorly and inefficiently administered
is but little more acceptable because of promptness in the rendition
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of its results. The whole probleiji will have to be dealt with sooner
or later, probably gradually, in a much more thorough-going and
constructive way; I cannot undertake to outline, in a single article,
hurriedly prepared, anything approximating a comprehensive
statement of desirable details of change; I undertake only to present
for consideration certain impressions which have come to me and
are put to paper for what they may be worth, in the stimulation of
thought or otherwise.
Contrast legal procedure and judicial organization as it is with
what it might become, through taking into account the administrative expedients and practices which have become familiar in business
and commercial life. A business man has a cause of action against
another business man. Neither he nor the other man had any quarrel
with the legal rules which give rise to the action; they'had their
business dealings on the basis of familiar and settled rules of law;
they disagree somewhat as to the facts of the case; what they want
is a speedy determination of the facts, and then a prompt determination of their rights under the facts as found and the applicable rules
of law, as commonly observed in the community for the conduct
of similar business dealings. So the man with the cause of action
consults his lawyer, and from that point difficulty begins and the
business man's instincts for common-sense, direct action tending to
reach the merits of the case run afoul of legal procedure.
The Forum, the Pleadingsand Their Service
First come the pleadings. Around the legal concept of a "complaint" and "answer" has been created a great, swaddling mass
of technicalities. Instead of simply, concisely apprising the adversary as to the amount, nature and basis of the claim, we have
developed a tradition of doing what is strangely called "stating facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action," and the first rule of all is
that the pleader must not "state evidence," must not "aver conclusions," but must build a "projectile-proof" edifice of words
which will stand the test of "demurrer" and "motion" based on all
sorts of grounds and controlled by prodigious quantities of precedents,
all of which give to the document qualities of circumlocution, indirection, technicality, and the like, which continue to curse and plague
the whole course of the case. I do not think it can be said that our
present system of pleading commonly serves any end of justice;
it is not a method of narrowing issues, eliciting truth, defining rights,
or securing direct approach to the matters really in controversy.
Anyone with a contrary impression would lose it soon, if he had often
to listen to the efforts of counsel to cross-examine plaintiff or defend-
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ant as to. the contents of pleadings verified by the party under
interrogation.
The second problem comes as to jurisdiction and choice of the
court in which action is to be started. Here again the business man
confronts another maze, with the peril of defeat as the penalty for
wrong inference from the mass of code provisions and judicial decisions. Instead of one court, we have many; instead of equivalent
powers and jurisdictions in each of the courts even within the financial
limits of its jurisdiction, we have in many instances an unfathomable
hodge-podge, one aspect of which I have already elaborated upon
in connection with my own court. Could a nation ever fight and
win a war with a military organization limited and hampered as is
judicial organization? Could a business establishment ever succeed?
The next anachronism is disclosed in the matter of service of the
summons and complaint. The methods of "legal service" are so
indirect, clumsy and out-of-date as to make a down-town business
man laugh in the face of a judicial officer who has to work with such
antiquated tools. It is as though men were compelled by law to
ride in oxcarts and light their homes with tallow dips. The code
provisions as to service of papers ignore everything that has happened
in the world since the post office became a governmental institution.
The registered mail, the telegraph, and the telephone are modem
devices which the law is unique and solitary in failing to recognize
as means whereby one person may bring about the presence of
another at a desired place at an indicated time.
The Handling of Interlocutory Applications
From the time the case is at issue it runs a course which mocks all
the rules and expedients of directness and efficiency in handling affairs
which have been developed by modem business experience. Everything is done at arm's length; interlocutory applications of a purely
administrative character, designed to narrow the issues, bring out
the facts on undisputed issues, and prepare the controversy for trial
under circumstances somewhat approximating adjudication on the
actual merits, are treated as a part of a game of wits, are subjected
to the authority of long-time precedents, instead of being judged
on the merits of the situation disclosed in the particular case. Probably as many different judges express casual opinions regarding
aspects of the case as there are applications made; the judge who
has determined any of these 1reliminary things is rarely the judge
who finally tries the case. The granting or withholding of these
interlocutory expedients, such as discovery of books and papers,
examination before trial, bills of particulars, amplification or clarifi-
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cation of the complaint, or the like, are permitted in this country
to be the subject of appeals, and appellate courts undertake to
re-determine each such matter as of first impression under the great
mass of previous decisions, instead of looldng upon it as a matter on
which the judge at special term was warranted in using a reasonable
discretion as to the method to be followed to prepare the case for a
prompt, expeditious trial on the merits of its actual issues. The
result of this casual attention on the part of many judges, in the
trial court and on appeal, is long delay and a very unsatisfactory
and fragmentary determination of phases of it by judicial officers
who have casually dealt with the interlocutory applications.
A Trial Built for Appeal and Re-Trial Rather Than Determination
The trial itself lumbers on in practically the same fashion as was
the vogue fifty or a hundred years ago. Methods and procedure
throughout the business, political and industrial world have changed
radically; the court lumbers on in practically the same old way,
and committees on lbw reform rarely essay the task of giving sanction
to more direct, exact, and business-like expedients. The stenographer is about the only device at all modem which the court-room
trial has utilized to any degree, and even the stenographer is in
nowise used to promote exactness of determination by court and
jury upon the particular trial; the stenographer's services are to
prepare the way for an appeal, and perhaps to guard the better
against changes of testimony on a second trial. The stenographer
rarely does anything to aid the jury or the presiding judge to deal
in exact and business-like fashion with the case on the first trial;
no business office would think of utilizing the stenographer so little
and so indirectly in connection with the performance of the task
at hand. As in many other respects, the mechanics of the courtroom trial point to and prepare the way for an appeal, rather than
promote an initial determination which would obviate appeal.
I sometimes wonder if the time will not come when the stenographer's
minutes or some improved "dictaphone" record of the testimony
will not be available for the aid of the jury.
I think I have sufficiently indicated a few of the aspects of legal
procedure which give an impression of indirectness, inexactness
and unsuitableness for the accomplishment of the object supposed
to be in mind. There are many phases which I have not touched
upon in this connection,-for example, the modes of bringing witnesses
to court, the anomalies in the law of evidence, the whole structure
and theory of appellate review, the procedure after a higher court
reaches the conclusion that error was committed on the trial below;
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but it seems preferable to devote the remaining paragraphs of this
article to the constructive and affirmative side, the things which
are worth thinking over as possible betterments in the practical
workings of the legal mechanism. It should be kept in mind that,
of course, any particular system or routine of legal procedure or
juridical organization does not exist for its own sake and is not an end
or objective in itself. The impartial, impersonal, expert arbitrament
of private controversies under rules of law which nullify individual
caprice and take no account of political influence, social position,
or financial accumulations, is one of the great purposes for which
Anglo-Saxon governments exist; but the mechanism, the procedure,
are only means to an end, and should be scrutinized and dealt with
as such.
The Real Rights of Litigants and the Public
In the second place, it is often necessary to bring back to
mind a realization that a law-suit is not a game of wits between
opposing counsel; that no litigant has any right, vested or otherwise,
in a mode of procedure which gives him a "sporting chance" to win
on anything except disclosure and establishment of the actual
merits of his case; that he has no right at all to delay; and that
the community itself has great reasons for interest in the maintenance
of a system of administering justice under which a determination
on the merits will be speedily, economically, efficiently reached,
and under which no member of the community need feel that he has
won or lost under "rules" and concepts which the community as a
whole has with propriety long ago discarded. One of the great
obstacles to reform in legal procedure has been the conscious or
unconscious feeling of many lawyers that they have been schooled
and trained to play a game, and their instinctive aversion to change
in the rules, especially such a change as would mean that a prospective litigant with "no case at all" would soon find himself without
need for the services of a lawyer. Many lawyers, and some litigants,
feel that they have a right to have perpetuated a judicial mechanism
under which a litigant with an astute lawyer can have "a run for his
money" and possibly win a verdict, even though on the actual facts
and established rules of law, he should have had judgment taken
against him on the day after his adversary interposed his pleading.
Three-fourths of the difficulty would be on the way to solution, if
we could get out of the minds of lawyers and laymen the notion
that the law is a game whose motto is "win if you can," rather than
a branch and phrase of government charged with a very important
responsibility for reaching exactly and acceptably a result which is

BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
the very basis of free institutions. The lawyer schooled in a notion
that his client should have a "right" to "a chance to win" where the
law and the facts disclose no such possible right, is the worst foe
of procedural reform through outside action and the most stubborn
opponent of the efforts of judges to deal more directly with the
situation themselves. In so far as we come to have lawyers with a
more sincere and serious concept of what they are supposed to be
doing and why there are lawyers at all, the mechanics of jurisprudence
will be a less difficult problem, and changes in rules will be less
essential, although still important.
"Specialized Judges" vs. "Specialized Courts"
But to indicate briefly some of these queries as to possible change
for the better. In the first place, instead of perpetuating all these
troublesome questions about jurisdiction, whether the right action
has been brought in the right court, and the like, would it not be
better to adopt, as a working principle and an ideal to be approximated in judicial organization, the concept of a single great court
for the trial and determination of all cases and controversies, irrespective of their nature, the amount involved, or the basis of the relief
asked? At the present time we have specialized courts,--civil, criminal,
surrogates', county, municipal, city, supreme, and the like; we have
all sorts of anomalies of jurisdiction for each court, as we have seen,
and arbitrary lines of demarcation between them; if a suit is started
in the wrong court, the plaintiff has all his trouble for nothing, and
has to start all over again. Instead of having specialized courts,
would it not be better to have specialized judges, a court with complete jurisdiction of every phase of a controversy and power to do
therein everything which a court can do in arbitrament and enforcement, and then the judges thereof assigned to various branches or
parts, to deal there in specialized fashion with those types of litigation which they have shown themselves most competent to handle?
Organizationand Utilization of Administrative Staff
In the second place, does it not seem fair and business-like that a
court should be given adequate administrative organization and
adequate administrative control over its own clerical subordinates?
Courts are commonly thought of as made up of judges, a clerk or so,
an officer, a stenographer, and perhaps an interpreter of foreign
languages. In fact the administrative staff of a metropolitan court
is a great unwieldy mass of unorganized employees, often chosen or
promoted for reasons largely political, subject to no direct authority
or responsible control, and utilized to a very small percentage of their
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potential usefulness in the administration of justice. A judicial
officer on the civil side is practically marooned, so far as administrative aid in the ascertainment and disclosure of the facts pertinent
to pending controversies, and yet what is the situation so far as the
employees of the courts are concerned? On the civil side of the
Supreme Court in the First Judicial District of New York State, comprising the counties of Manhattan and the Bronx, $66o,ooo a year is
paid to judges, $774,000 to clerks, and $66o,ooo to attendants. In
view of the fact that the judges receive $I7,5oo a year in salary, the
significance of these figures is startling. Taking into account the
civil, criminal and appellate branches of the Supreme Court in the
same area, twenty-two per cent of the total salary list is for the judges;
two million dollars a year are paid to the clerical force and attendants
alone. The business and administrative side, as well as the performance by the judges of their judicial function, needs greatly to
be organized and modernized.
Why Ignore Modern Business Methods
Again, is not there need for a great modernization and adaptation
of present-day business devices in bringingmen to court as litigants,
witnesses, and in other capacities? Is there any reason, under
modem conditions, why registered mail could not be made as acceptable a method of service of a summons and complaint as so-called
"personal service?" Is there any reason why most petty cases
could not be as well started by mail notification from the clerk's
offices? Is there any reason why the old-time system of subpoenaeing all witnesses for ten o'clockin themorning of court day after court
day, by personal service of a subpoena, should be adhered to at all
hazards, in disregard of modem expedients such as the telephone and
telegraph which might make it possible for witnesses to remain in their
offices until more nearly the time when their presence will be actually
needed? Perhaps the most serious and the least excusable of all
the waste of valuable time inflicted by our present legal system is
the wanton waste of the time of helpless and unoffending witnesses, left altogether at the mercy of the indifference of counsel and
the lumberings of a system of notification which dates back to the day
when the farmer drove to the court-house at the county-seat in
the morning after he had finished his milking and attendance at court
took on some of the aspects of a gala occasion.
Still again, ought not our judicial system for the handling of
causes to be so adjusted that each case would receive, from start to
finish, the continuous attention of one trained judicial mind, familiar
with all its incidents and development, rather than the casual animad-
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version of many judges dealing with it in offhand and fragmentary
fashion? I am impressed that one of two things ought to be done;
I am not sure as yet which is preferable. The first is that all stages
of the case, up to the time of actual trial, should be under the supervision and authority of a single judicial officer, to whom all interlocutory applications should be addressed, and who would really see
to it that the case was in such shape as to get a fair determination
of the disputed questions of law and fact on their merits. Thereafter
the case would come before another judicial officer for actual trial.
One Judge on All Phases of Each Case
The alternative method would be to have the same judge
also try the case who had handled its preliminary phases. The
present system puts the trial judge in poor position to be a factor
for the working out of justice in the particular case, for it has usually
been mussed and muddled, long before it came before him, by an
indefinite number of judges, and he knows, and can learn, in the brief
time available before he has had to rule on the decisive issues, little
as to the history and previous course of the litigation. In the place
of our present system of handling ." pleadings" and the various
interlocutory applications, it seems t6 me that something more like
the following plan would be more likely to work out acceptable and
substantial justice accordihg to the actual merits, and would greatly
reduce the number of cases ever actually tried at all:
When an action is started, it should be assigned at once to a single
judge or commissioner, to have oversight over everything taking place
in the action, at least up to the time of trial. The "pleadings"
or notification with which the proceeding is started need be only a
brief, concise apprisal of the defeildant as to the nature and amount
of the claim; further details could well be left to be developed, upon
the application of the defendant, under the supervision of the judge
or commissioner in charge of the preliminary phases of the suit.
The sole object of this judicial officer should be to get the matter
in the best possible shape for the trial and disposition of the case
on the merits of the actual testim6 ny upon the issues of law or fact
which give rise to, and constitute the real "nub" of, the controversy
between the parties; and in doing this and seeking this result he
should act in direct, open-minded fashion, according to the needs
of the particular case, should act in a manner which would commonly
be regarded as in part administrative rather than solely formal and
judicial, should be left unhampered by multitudes of judicial decisions upon procedural matters, and should be subject to appellate
review only for arbitrary action and manifest departure from the
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fundamental purpose which I have indicated. Most of the interlocutory matters now regarded as "Special Term" functions would best
be taken out of the atmosphere of judicial determination and review
altogether, and the judicial officer left free to confer directly with the
*attorneys and their clients, consult the details and developments
of the particular case, and direct therein the doings of whatever may
seem best to promote the fundamental purpose of all action in advance
of and preparation for trial. For example, he should seek to shape
the pleadings so as to narrow and define the issues, and disclose the
actual issues; he should grant, supervise, conduct examinations
before trial, discovery of books, accounts, papers, and the like, in the
interests of justice and the full ascertainment of the facts. Most of
the facts in relation to the subject-matter of an action are not in
dispute; the ends of justice would be almost always served if these
were required to be agreed upon, reduced to written stipulations
and thus embodied in such form that the trial court and jury would
have before it the undisputed facts in such definiteness and accuracy
of form as to afford a good starting-point for the consideration of
the questions of fact which are disputed. For example, in the case
of an action against a street railway company for a crossing accident,
the physical facts as to the surroundings at the intersection, the
vehicles which figured in the accident, and the like, ought to be made
the subject-matter of well-formulated statements and suitable
photographs, as better basis for the guidance of the jury when it
takes up the questions really disputed.
Queslions Which Should Not Be in Issue At All
There are many matters now left within the category of disputed
questions as to which the judge 6r commissioner ought to prepare
the way to place at the disposal of the eventual trial court the
results of better administrative handling of the case, with the
objective of fairly ascertaining and fully disclosing the true facts ever
in mind. For example, thousands of cases tried in the courts of this
city each year turn upon the question of the conformance of goods
delivered to sample furnished or to trade description quoted. These
questions are of necessity dealt with, at present, in a court-room
trial, in the most crude, offhand, inaccurate manner; there is a wide
and inexcusable margin of error; time and again the efforts of
adroit, unscrupulous counsel and glib, lying witnesses completely
fool the jury on such issues. Under a proper system such questions,
or cases turning on such questions alone, would hardly ever reach a
jury at all. They are questions, in the first instance not for a jury
or court at all, but for a bureau of standards, trained in analysis,
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familiar with trade formulas, expert in trade standards. To such a
body the judge or commissioner should have power to refer a case
involving questions such as I have indicated, and its expert, impartial,
disinterested, report upon the facts, for example, as to the ingredients
of the sample furnished and of the goods delivered, should be thus
made available to the trial court, if the case ever came to the point
of trial. In point of fact no large proportion of commercial controversies would ever survive such a scrutiny as I have indicated in the
foregoing paragraphs; the system would sound the death-knell
of "strike" and "hold-up" litigation. Any system which lessens
the chance of unmerited victory and decreases the possible effectiveness of the efforts of counsel to lead the trial away from the actual
facts, the real merits, will greatly decrease the volume of baseless
litigation. Any system likewise which leads to generous mutual
disclosure, in advance, of the documentary and other evidence,
and the legal and other contentions, on which the opposing claims
are mutually based, will have the greatest possible effect in bringing
about settlement, through compromise, concession, or otherwise.
As the litigants and their counsel find the controversy reduced to its
lowest terms, they will find surprisingly little left to litigate about,
aside from questions of law, which they will find the right sort of
counsel can determine for them just about as well, and much less
expensively, out of court as upon a court-room trial.
There are many phases of betterments which might prove of aid
to the administering of justice, each of which would be suitable
subject-matter for a whole article by itself, and therefore can only
be indicated within the permissible limits of this article. For
example, upon the whole matter of so-called "expert" testimony,
a better administrative organization of our judicial mechanism,
based upon the fundamental principle which runs through the present
discussion, vould enable the trial court and jury to have the aid of
really expert information, the advice and counsel of disinterested,
qualified, well-informed specialists, whose trained observation and
impartial opinions would be of real help to the jury, and would put
to rout the scandalous brigade of hirelings who so often masquerade
as "experts" in aid of whichever side unconscionably brings them
into court. Radical change in the whole basis of "expert" testimony
is one of the most important of the potential betterments in procedure
which would make for accuracy and acceptability of the results
reached through the administration of justice under law.
The Workable Ideal of Our JudicialSystem
The enforced limits of space and time forbid a similar discussion
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of the mechanics of court-room trial and the mechanics of appellate
review, although the queries already advanced have, of course, a
vital bearing upon the entire subsequent history of a suit thus started.
In a subsequent article, with the permission of the editors of ehe
QUARTERFY,

I shall endeavor to present some similar queries as to

possible betterments in the mode of conducting the trial itself, and
also certain comments upon the ptoceedings to be had, after initial
trial, to correct error and arrive at the proper result. The workable
ideal of our judicial system ought, in my judgment, to be as to every
civil action: "One prompt, fair, impartial trial on the merits, With
full disclosure of the actual facts, and then, if either party feels
aggrieved, one appeal, to a court vested with plenary power to
correct, and not merely detect, error, and conform the result reached
below to the requirements of the correct legal rule as maturely
conceived by the appellate tribunal." We are still a long way from
that practicable ideal in this country, but the time may not be far
disfant when the young men who are now coming to the bar will find
themselves confronted with the task of working out the details of
fulfilling an emphatic public demand in these respects.
Let no one think that this article or its predecessor has been
inspired by any lack of appreciation of the work of our courts and
the importance of the proper discharge of the judicial function in a
democracy. There is in my judgment no task more fundamental,
no phase of public service or professional activity to which a young
man may more satisfactorily devote his energy, vision and enthusiasm. We make our mistake when we conceive the administration
of justice under law to be a task entrusted to courts alone. As was
pointed out in the previous article, many vital aspects of legal
administration are now entrusted to regulative commissions and
quasi-judicial tribunals which have been given more adequate,
suitable organization because emancipated from what has thus far
been our tradition as to tribunals called courts. Every young man
at the bar, whether or not in a judicial office, and whether or not
identified with any of those newer instrumentalities of juridical
administration which link up so intimately to the whole topic of
betterment in our courts, will find ample opportunity for full use
of his talents and constructive abilities in the days and years that
are ahead. These articles have been prolix and fragmentary, but
if they can have any part in persuading any young men of the profession resolutely to "keep their eyes on the ball" and measure up to
the major task which the public will shortly impose in earnest upon
the bar and the courts, they will have fulfilled their purpose.

